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James N. Baron, Frank R. Dobbin, and P. Devereaux Jennings 
Stanford University 
This paper charts the transformation of  the employment relation- 
ship in different industries during the second quarter of this century 
and is based on a representative sampling of  U.S. business organi- 
zations. The first section documents changes in the control systems 
that prevailed  in U.S. industries between the Depression and the 
end of  World War 11. The descriptive analyses generally corrobo- 
rate portraits that have recently been provided by neo-Marxists of 
how and where technical and bureaucratic controls evolved. The 
second section sketches an explanation for the rapid diffusion  of 
bureaucratic controls that apparently occurred between  1939 and 
1946. It examines the role of  three key constituencies in shaping 
modern systems of work force control: labor unions, personnel pro- 
fessionals, and the state. In particular, the analyses underscore the 
large role of government intervention in manpower activities during 
World  War I1  in bureaucratizing employment.  This effect of  the 
state blurs the distinction between "efficiency" and "control" expla- 
nations of bureaucratic controls and internal labor markets, calling 
attention to institutional sources of change in organizations' employ- 
ment structures. The concluding section highlights the implications 
of  the findings for efforts to understand the employment relation- 
ship. 
Recent research has examined how organizational  and institutional ar- 
rangements shape labor market outcomes, rekindling interest in how and 
why employment practices vary across sectors of  the economy.  Differ- 
ences among firms and industries in work arrangements, control systems, 
and the presence of  internal labor markets are claimed to account for 
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T. DiPrete, N. Fligstein, M. Hannan, S. Jacoby, T. Kochan, J. Meyer, D. Palmer, J. 
Pfeffer, G. Strauss, and AJS reviewers were very helpful. Requests for reprints should 
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career inequalities by age, sex, race, and ethnicity (see Hodson and Kauf- 
man 1982). Researchers studying organizations have also been concerned 
with the evolution of  workplace control and internal labor markets, al- 
though for  slightly  different reasons:  their  interest  is in  the origins of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy.  Economists and organization theorists have 
traditionally viewed modern bureaucratic arrangements as rational and 
efficient.  Others-particularly  neo-Marxists-regard  hierarchy  and in- 
ternal labor markets as elements of a "bureaucratic control" system that 
co-opts workers by reducing disserlt and solidarity. 
Efficiency and control theories, however, involve some similar expla- 
nations of  the evolution of  bureaucratic employment arrangements.  Di- 
vergent theories sometimes point  to the same causes but interpret the 
underlying  mechanisms  differently.  For instance,  Marxists highlight a 
"crisis of  control" occasioned by increasing organizational scale in Ameri- 
can  enterprise  (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich  1982, p.  175), whereas 
orthodox organization  theorists stress the technical and administrative 
superiority  of  bureaucracy  in  large  organizations  (e.g.,  Blau  and 
Schoenherr 1971). Gordon et al. also emphasize employers' attempts ear- 
lier this century to reduce turnover as technologies became more sophis- 
ticated, costly, and susceptible to disruption. This factor too is discussed 
by various efficiency theorists, who highlight the transaction costs associ- 
ated with replacing workers who command firm-specific skills (Doeringer 
and Piore  1971; Williamson  1975). Finally,  neo-Marxists  have empha- 
sized management's desire to forestall or weaken unionization by vesting 
control in impersonal technical and administrative arrangements.  Here 
too their historical portrait overlaps with other accounts. For instance, 
institutionalists since Slichter (1919) have traced modern personnel prac- 
tices to union avoidance efforts. However, these authors typically assert 
that bureaucratic practices  were  not  forced  on  labor conspiratorily or 
malevolently; rather, "workers had strong interests in the characteristic 
bureaucratic features of  the internal labor market" (Jacoby 1984, p.  57; 
also see Steiber 1959; Kahn 1976; Rubery  1978; Elbaum 1984). Conse- 
quently, it is not easy empirically to distinguish portraits of  the employ- 
ment relation that emphasize imperatives of social control from accounts 
emphasizing organizational efficiency and rationality. 
In short, increased interest in the consequences of  contemporary em- 
ployment systems has renewed theoretical debates about their origins. As 
a result, there has been a recent flowering of  historical research on the 
This paper  occasionally uses the  phrase  "bureaucratic control" in  referring  to  a 
cluster of personnel practices that neo-Marxists view as integral to that system, such as 
centralized personnel functions, job  evaluation,  and the like.  However,  we do not 
mean to imply that those personnel  practices  were necessarily effective as control 
devices, which is an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper. American Journal of  Sociology 
advent of  modern personnel practices. This paper extends this research 
by charting the transformation of  the employment relationship during the 
second quarter of  this century. We first describe changes in  the preva- 
lence of personnel practices in U.S. business firms from the Depression to 
the years following World War 11.  Past historical studies have described 
changing employment systems in specific industries, such as iron and steel 
(Steiber  1959; Stone  1974; Elbaum  1984) or chronicled changes in the 
U. S. economy (or manufacturing sector) as a whole (e.  g., Clawson 1980; 
Gordon et al. 1982; Lawrence 1984; Jacoby  1985). Our analyses, in con- 
trast,  are based  on  several large  and comprehensive  surveys  of  U.S. 
corporations across diverse industries. Our findings generally corroborate 
and extend the results of  previous historical analyses and case studies of 
how and where "bureaucratic control" developed. 
We first describe the data sources used to chart the transformation of 
personnel practices. Then, after considering various efficiency and con- 
trol accounts of  the modern employment relation, we sketch an institu- 
tional explanation of  the spread of bureaucratic controls during and after 
World War 11.  In particular, we focus on the role of  three key constitu- 
encies in shaping modern systems of  work force control: labor unions, 
personnel professionals, and the state. Our analyses underscore how gov- 
ernment intervention in labor markets during World War I1 helped bu- 
reaucratize  employment, just  as "pressures  from wartime  government 
agencies had played a large part in fostering specialized employment de- 
partments during World War I" (Kochan and Cappelli 1984, p. 138; see also 
Harris 1982, p. 160). This effect of  the state further blurs the distinction 
between efficiency and control perspectives by calling attention to institu- 
tional sources of  change in organizations' personnel systems (Meyer and 
Brown 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). We also describe how personnel 
professionals spearheaded attempts to extend bureaucratic controls after 
World War 11. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The Sample 
To describe changes in employment practices, we analyze data gathered 
by the National Industrial Conference Board (hereafter, NICB)3 in 1927, 
1935, 1939, and 1946 (NICB 1927; 1928; 1936; 1940; 1947). The NICB 
publications  based  on these  studies tabulate the prevalence  of  specific 
personnel practices by industry. Unfortunately, firm-level data were not 
This organization has since changed its name to the Conference Board. War and Peace 
available; our results may therefore suffer from aggregation biases (Han- 
nan 1971). In fact, the industrial designations are so broad for the 1927 
survey that we employ those data only minimally. 
The NICB attempted to survey the entire population of  organizations 
in the industries listed in table 1, using companies listed by the New York 
Stock Exchange, Dun and Bradstreet publications, and other firm listings 
as sampling frames. The 1935 sample included 2,452 firms, which em- 
ployed 4.5 million workers,  15.5% of  the national labor force in these 
industry classifications at the time (NICB 1936, p. 5). The 1939 survey 
covered 2,700 firms with 5 million employees, and the 1946 survey cov- 
ered 3,498 firms with an unspecified number of  employees. Mean firm 
size was  1,836 and  1,847 in the  1935 and  1939 samples, respectively, 
demonstrating the prevalence of  large companies in these surveys. Small 
enterprises,  however,  were  by  no  means excluded: 33%  of  firms had 
fewer than 250 employees in 1935, as did 32% and 25% in 1939 and 1946, 
respectively. The fact that the 1946 sample contained a lower percentage 
of  small firms may reflect real changes in mean U.S. firm size during 
World War I1 (see, e.  g., U.  S. Bureau of the Census 1950, p. 23). The mix 
of  industries remained fairly constant across surveys; the largest number 
of  firms was in steel and metalworking, and 80%-85%  of  the firms were 
in manufacturing in each sample. Moreover, the NICB samples included 
many of  their member organizations, and the same organizations often 
participated in the various surveys over the years. Thus, while these data 
by no means constitute a panel study, there appear to be considerable 
continuity and comparability across surveys. 
It is difficult  to estimate precisely how  representative  these  samples 
are  of  the  population  of  U.S.  business  firms  as a  whole,  since  only 
establishment-level data are available from government sources during 
this period  (see Granovetter  1984). We compared the size and regional 
distribution of  manufacturing firms in the NICB sample against the pop- 
ulation of U.S. manufacturing enterprises. This comparison suggests that 
the NICB samples overrepresented large northeastern firms (NICB 1936, 
p. 8; U.  S. Bureau of the Census 1938, p. 20). Moreover, some industries 
with  bimodal  size  distributions-particularly  food  (large  production 
plants vs. small proprietorships),  banks (commercial banks vs. savings 
and loans), insurance (companies vs.  local brokers), and trade (depart- 
ment stores vs. family groceries)-exhibit  higher  average  sizes in  the 
NICB samples than in the population.  Thus the NICB samples almost 
certainly represent larger corporations in these industries better than they 
do the many smaller ones. _ 
The fact that the samples are biased toward large northeastern firms is 
due partly to a limited sampling frame but also undoubtedly to response TABLE  I 
PERCENTAGE  OF  FIRMS  IN SELECTED  INDUSTRIES  HAVING  PERSONNEL  PRACTICES  RELATED  TO INTERNAL  LABOR  MARKETS:  1927.  1935.  1939.  1946 
PERSONNEL  PRACTICE 
Personnel Department*  Centralized Employmentt  Job Analysis$ 
INDU~TRY  1927  1935  1939  1946  1927  1935  1939  1946  1935  1939  1946 
...  Agricultural implements ................  40.0  20.8  ...  55.0  25.0  ...  25.0  25.0  ... 
Electrical manufacturing  ...............  43.3  45.3  74.7  ...  61.1  57.3  74.7  32.2  30.8  43.3 
Food products  .....................  2.4  28.3  30.8  58.6  4.0  39.8  35.9  58.6  15.9  20.5  33.3 
Leather and its products  ............  2.7  16.0  20.3  46.6  3.2  24.0  28.1  46.6  13.3  18.8  25.9 
............  Machines and machine tools  30.3  32.7  65.8  ...  39.8  41.2  65.8  18.6  21.9  38.1 
Paper and its products  ..............  6.2  34.8  38.1  61.4  12.9  44.5  47.8  61.4  19.4  20.9  39.7 
Printing and publishing  .............  3.1  18.6  24.5  50.0  4.9  22.1  35.7  50.0  9.3  12.2  26.7 
Rubber ...........................  3.6  62.5  50.0  74.6  10.7  62.5  57.9  74.6  35.0  28.9  44.1 
Textiles and clothing  ...............  2.8  24.4  22.3  61.6  5.2  38.9  42.9  61.6  15.7  26.7  32.4 
....  Chemicals and chemical products  2.4  29.8  27.3  61.9  4.8  43.9  43.0  61.9  15.8  20.3  37.0 
Automobiles and parts  .................  52.1 
G,  Aircraft and parts  .....................  ...  (60.6)  :j::  ...  68"5  ...  (65.4)  g;::  27-4  ...  (34.6)  ti::  (59.5) 
cn  Metals and metal products  ..........  2.5  28.9  34.9  64.6  7.4  40.9  41.9  64.6  16.4  19.6  32.6 
Mining  .............................  25.0  19.0  ...  ...  35.7  31.0  ...  14.3  4.8  ... 
Coalandcoke  ........................  ...  ...  59.3  ...  ...  ...  33.3  ...  ...  14.8 
...  ...  Lumber  ...........................  2.2  12.3  17.4  3.8  24.5  29.8  5.7  13.2  ... 
...  ...  ...  Stone, clay, and glass  ..................  2  1.2  24.0  16.7  30.0  3.0  15.0  ... 
Glass  ...................................  ...  48.1  ...  ...  ...  37.0  ...  ...  22.2 
.........  Building materials and supplies  ...  ...  47.7  ...  ...  ...  47.7  ...  ...  21.5 
Petroleum  ..........................  33.3  44.7  73.1  ...  37.8  44.7  73.1  32.4  31.9  59.6 
Banking  .............................  72.5  64.5  65.6  jBO8)  .  65.0  66.1  45.0  24.2  59.4  (544) 
Finance and investment companies  ......  ...  ...  40.0  ...  ...  .  g::  (60.8)  ...  ...  33.3 
...  Insurance  ............................  71.8  59.5  74.1  82.1  73.8  74.1  28.2  28.6  59.3 
Gas and electricity  .................  55.1  58.2  73.6  46.4  54.9  66.9  24.6  34.1  47.1 
...  Transportation and communication  ...  28.2  3.y  ...  ij  :3  (I  (&-I  23.0  30-8  ... 
6.8  19.2  .....  Transportation ..................... 
...  ...  Communication and broadcasting  ....  ...  ...  69.2  ...  ...  i::;  (62.7)  ...  ...  :::;  (40.0) 
Wholesale and retail tradef  ..........  5.1  59.2  5  1.5  64.2  6.1  59.2  55.7  64.2  23.7  15.5  40.6 
All industries (firms with fewer than 
250 employees) .................  2.5  5.4  7.3  29.6  6.2  17.8  17.4  29.6  5.2  10.0  12.7 
All industries (firms with 250 + 
employees)  ....................  34.3  46.0  47.2  74.6  41.8  53.2  55.2  74.6  24.1  27.3  44.9 American Journal of  Sociology 
bias.4 The NICB members have traditionally had higher response rates 
than nonmembers, and "in any survey that is conducted solely through 
correspondence it seems justifiable  to assume that it is the more progres- 
sive companies that will cooperate" (NICB 1947, p. 3). Yet despite these 
real and potential biases, the prevalence of  the personnel practices that 
we examine is actually lower than in other surveys conducted during this 
period,  which  probably suffered from even  more severe response  and 
sample biases.  For example, although the mean firm  size in  the  1935 
NICB sample (1,836) was higher than the population mean for establish- 
ments, two other surveys done at that time reported mean firm sizes of 
2,557  and 4,753 (Pierce School  1935; Parks  1936). In addition, three 
surveys from the early 1930s of  personnel practices,  all more limited in 
coverage, reported even greater prevalence of personnel departments, job 
analyses, rating systems, and employment tests than did the 1935 NICB 
survey, both  in the aggregate and for specific industries (Pierce School 
1935; Parks  1936; Timmons  1931). For instance, Pierce  School  (1935) 
reported that 43% of  the 254 firms surveyed used job analysis, whereas 
18% of  firms in the NICB sample reported using job  analysis (or 27% 
when NICB industry groups are weighted to reflect the industry mix in 
the Pierce School study). For those few industries represented by a rela- 
tively large number of  cases in these  smaller surveys, estimates of  the 
prevalence of  various personnel practices correspond more closely to the 
NICB data. This, in turn, gives us some confidence in the NICB data. 
In short, the NICB surveys apparently provide the most reliable and 
comprehensive data available on personnel practices in the early decades 
of this century. One historian of  the period refers to the NICB studies as 
"excellent in every respect,  . . . [they] offer the best statistical evidence 
available on most aspects of  welfare capitalism" (Brandes 1976, p.  193), 
and scholars  have recently  used  these  data in  charting the spread of 
personnel  departments and internal labor markets (e.g., Jacoby  1983, 
1984, 1985; Kochan and Cappelli 1984). Although the samples are per- 
haps biased toward organizations that were likely to adopt bureaucratic 
personnel practices,  and thus may misrepresent overall levels of  usage, 
they portray employment practices across industries and over time more 
accurately and in greater detail than other possible data sources. 
Personnel Practices Studied 
Three major changes in employment management occurred during the 
early decades of  this century. This first was the introduction of  "welfare 
Response rates were reported only for the 1946 study, when 3,498 of  12,000 com- 
panies (29.2%) complied with the NICB survey request. War and Peace 
work" practices, with which some firms (e.g., Pullman) were experiment- 
ing as early  as the  1880s (Slichter  1919). These were the ancestors of 
modern benefits packages but were considered philanthropic endeavors 
rather than extensions of  employee rights. The second change concerned 
the increasing specialization and rationalization of work roles occasioned 
by  scientific  management.  Time and motion  studies and job  analyses 
were conducted, job requirements codified, job descriptions introduced, 
and  job  training  formalized  as  scientific  principles  were  applied  to 
rationalize the production process itself. The third set of changes involved 
adopting or extending personnel practices to foster long-term employment 
and internal labor markets within firms: hiring, promotion, and firing 
were  centralized  and regularized;  exiting employees  were  interviewed; 
systematic turnover records were kept; salary classification,  rating sys- 
tems, and job ladders were introduced or extended; and centralized per- 
sonnel units flourished (Gordon et al. 1982, p.  189). 
This paper focuses  on the evolution  of  the second and third sets of 
practices,  which Edwards (1979) has identified as the underpinnings of 
"technical"  and "bureaucratic" control systems, respectively.  Of course, 
the fact that personnel  functionaries in  a  given  company reported  the 
presence of  a practice, such as job evaluation, does not tell us about its 
specific content, scope, or effects. Nonetheless, we believe that these data 
describing the prevalence of specific personnel practices are invaluable in 
charting the bureaucratization of  employment across industries and over 
time. First, we briefly summarize temporal and industrial differences in 
the use of  employment practices comprising technical and bureaucratic 
control systems. We then examine several key sources of  change in per- 
sonnel practice during this period, supplementing our descriptive statis- 
tics with relevant historical materials. 
RESULTS 
Changes in Personnel Systems, 1927-46 
Table 1 shows (by industry and year) the percentage of  firms surveyed 
using selected  personnel   practice^.^  Neither the industry categories nor 
'  The 1927 data in table 1 pertain only to enterprises with fewer than 250 employees. 
However, information on a larger sample of  companies, including those with 250 or 
more employees, was available in 1927 for several industrial relations activities (NICB 
1928, pp.  68-69).  The industry-specific percentages were generally comparable  for 
both samples, suggesting that the estimates reporfed' for small enterprises in table 1 
reasonably represent the prevalence of personnel practices among all businas organi- 
zations in 1927. Moreover, 96.5% of  all manufacturing enterprises were in that size 
range in 1927, although roughly half of manufacturing employment was in organiza- 
tions with more than 250 employees (NICB 1927, pp.  1-2). American Journal of  Sociology 
the precise descriptions of every practice studied by the NICB remained 
identical across surveys (see footnotes to table  Consequently, the rows 
of  table  1 are arranged to facilitate comparisons for a given industrial 
sector across years, and in some cases percentages have also been  ag- 
gregated across industrial categories to make such comparisons easier.' 
Table  1 indicates that by  1935 a  number of  bureaucratic personnel 
practices were already widespread in such nonmanufacturing industries 
as banking, insurance, trade, utilities, and transportation. These indus- 
tries are often claimed to have followed the lead of innovative manufac- 
turing companies in structuring employment (Baker 1940; Martell 1954). 
If so, then bureaucratic controls apparently difSused more rapidly in non- 
manufacturing industries in this period, since they were more prevalent 
there by  1935 than in even the most modern manufacturing industries. 
However, table  1 shows that selected bureaucratic practices were  also 
fairly prevalent by 1935 in modern, mass-production manufacturing in- 
dustries, particularly electrical manufacturing, automobiles, rubber, and 
agricultural implements. For instance, at least 40% of  the firms in each of 
these industries had personnel departments in 1935. These same indus- 
tries also made the widest use of  centralized employment, job analysis, 
job  evaluation, testing, rating systems, rule books, and seniority provi- 
sions. In contrast, those practices were much less prevalent in craft indus- 
tries such as leather, lumber, and printing and publishing, as well as in 
stone, clay, and glass. 
The few manufacturing industries that used bureaucratic practices ex- 
tensively  by  1935 also widely  employed time  and motion  studies, one 
legacy of  Taylorism. Of course, their mass-production technologies were 
better suited to scientific management  (see Bendix  1956, pp.  223-24). 
Firms in these newer industries may also have adopted modern employ- 
ment innovations more quickly because they were consistent with notions 
However, in cases where the definition of  an industry or personnel practice changed 
slightly across surveys, the trends are similar to cases where things remained constant. 
Thus, results in table 1 are unlikely to be distorted much by definitional changes across 
surveys. 
'  Certain entries in table 1 pertain to the maximum of multiple values among personnel 
practices; these are the variables defined (in the notes to table 1) as the percentage of 
firms in an industry having practice X "and/orn practice Y (e.g.,  the 1946 measure of 
rule books). Since the NICB did not publish tables giving industry-specific size distri- 
butions, the percentage estimates by size categories are understated slightly for those 
entries.  For instance, in computing the prevalence of  rule books in  1946, 38.3% of 
firms with 250 or more workers were listed as having employee handbooks and 25.7% 
had policy and procedure manuals, so table 1 reports the former figure as the percent- 
age in that size category having "rule books." However, some of the remaining 61.7% 
may have had policy and procedure manuals instead, in which case our estimate of the 
percentage using either practice is too low. War and Peace 
of  effective organizing that prevailed  at the time of  founding (Stinch- 
combe  1965). Well-documented  experiments  in  scientific management 
and  in  sustaining  long-term  employment  at International  Harvester, 
Ford, and elsewhere suggest that firms in these newer industries defined 
personnel innovation as an integral part of  manufacturing innovation. 
In sum, these descriptive results are not inconsistent with Edwards's 
(1979) typology of  different control systems, containing distinct sets of 
personnel activities, and with his classification of economic segments on 
the basis of  their predominant systems of  control (simple, technical, bu- 
reaucratic). The contemporary differences across industries that he em- 
phasizes are presaged by these data, which describe systems of workplace 
control in existence a half-century ago.8 
Between  1935 and 1939 (as between  1927 and 1935), there was little 
change in the prevalence of  most practices  listed in table 1. The use of 
time and motion studies, however, increased substantially in that period, 
from 35% to 49% of  all firms with more than 250 employees. By 1939, 
seniority provisions were also commonplace in a number of  manufactur- 
ing industries, stimulated in large measure by passage of  the Wagner Act 
(see section on "Unionization" below). 
The most striking findings in table  1, however, pertain to the period 
between  1939 and 1946. During World War 11,  there was a tremendous 
diffusion of  bureaucratic personnel practices. Job evaluation systems, for 
example, proliferated at  a very rapid rate between 1939 and 1946, even in 
small companies. Table 1 also records sizable wartime increases, espe- 
cially among larger  companies,  in  the incidence of  personnel  depart- 
ments, centralized employment procedures, rating systems (performance 
appraisals),  and  seniority  provisions.  Employment  tests  spread  less 
quickly during this period, no doubt because employers lowered hiring 
standards amid increased labor scarcity during the war. Finally, time and 
motion studies, associated with "technical" control and scientific manage- 
ment,  did  not  proliferate  much  during the  war except  for  modest in- 
creases in several nonmanufacturing industries. 
Overall, the evidence in table 1 suggests a wartime diffusion process 
whereby bureaucratic personnel practices, previously adopted widely in 
nonmanufacturing and the newer mass-production manufacturing indus- 
tries that utilized scientific management, spread to other industries. Note 
that the spread of  bureaucratic employment practices between  1939 and 
1946 was by no means restricted to industries of  strategic importance to 
the  war effort. Table  1 indicates,  for  instance, that job  analysis and 
These conclusions (and those that follow in this section) are buttressed by supplemen- 
tal analyses of the 1935-46  data, including factor and cluster analyses of industries and 
personnel practices. Detailed results are available on request. American Journal of  Sociology 
evaluation, seniority provisions, formalized personnel functions, and ser- 
vice emblems became increasingly commonplace in most industries dur- 
ing World War 11, as was true, to a lesser extent, of employment testing 
and performance  rating systems.  Later in this paper, we describe the 
pivotal role  of  government  activities during the war years in  bureau- 
cratizing employment, fostering organizational innovations that became 
institutionalized after the war ended. 
Sources of  Change in Personnel Systems 
How imperative is imperative? The effects  of  scale  and  turnover.-We 
noted earlier that many efficiency and control theories trace bureaucratic 
employment practices to scale imperatives and turnover problems con- 
fronting employers. In ongoing research, we are assessing how these and 
other factors shaped personnel activities in different U.S. industries over 
time.  Here,  we  wish  to  suggest  that  the  "imperatives"  stressed  by 
efficiency and control viewpoints were not all that imperative. 
It is certainly true that increasing organizational size favored bureau- 
cratizing employment, reflecting the administrative economies stressed by 
orthodox perspectives  and the "crises  of  control"  emphasized  by  neo- 
Marxists. The NICB data revesl, for instance, positive associations be- 
tween  average  firm  size  and the  prevalence  of  bureaucratic  controls 
across industries. However, the relationship is far from ironclad. Many 
firms sampled by the NICB were already very large well before World 
War I1  but had not yet  adopted  bureaucratic practices.  For instance, 
among companies with 5,000 or more employees, 75% had job evaluation 
in 1946 versus only 30% in 1939, and at least 50% had some merit rating 
system, compared with 33% in 1939 (NICB 1940, p. 47). There is also 
little evidence directly linking increases in average firm size within indus- 
tries between 1935 and 1939 to increases in bureaucratic personnel prac- 
tices in that period (see table 1 and NICB 1936, 1940). 
Tolbert and Zucker  (1983) have argued that internal organizational 
imperatives such as size might predict adoption of  bureaucratic innova- 
tions early in the diffusion process but not after the process is well under 
way. Table 2  suggests that this pattern pertains to the relationship be- 
tween firm size and the adoption of employment innovations. The rank- 
order correlation between average firm size in an industry and the pres- 
ence of  two key bureaucratic controls-specialized  personnel units and 
job  evaluation  systems-declined  considerably  in  manufacturing  be- 
tween 1935 and 1946.9  This decline is consistent with the institutionaliza- 
Table 2 reports rank-order correlations, so estimates of  association are unaffected by 
changes over time in the variances of variables. The table pertains only to manufactur- War and Peace 
TABLE 2 
NICB Sample  Population 
Personnel  Job  Personnel  Job 
YEAR  Department  Evaluation  Department  Evaluation 
-- - 
1935  ........  .67  .60  .48  .41 
(19)  (19)  (15)  (15) 
1939  ........  .33  .34  .33  .35 
(19)  (19)  (17)  (17) 
1946  ........  N.A.  N.A.  .21  .08 
(16)  (16) 
NOTE.-Number  in parentheses denotes N  of industries. N.A. = not available. 
tion process discussed by Toibert and Zucker: "As an increasing number 
of  organizations  adopt a  program  or  policy,  it becomes progressively 
institutiondized, or widely understood  to be  a necessary component of 
rationalized organizational structure" (1983, p. 35). "Efficiency impera- 
tives"  became less imperative as modern  personnel  administration  be- 
came standard operating procedure. 
Turnover is a second causal imperative emphasized by various per- 
spectives on the employment relation.  To be  sure, turnover and labor 
scarcity increased during the war period, when many bureaucratic prac- 
tices were adopted. Average monthly separation rates across all indus- 
tries rose from 3.1 per 100 workers in 1939 to a peak of  7.3 in 1943. Quit 
rates rose from 0.8 to 5.2 per 100 workers during this same period (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1940, 1943). Table 3 lists turnover rates before 
and during the war (September 1, 1940, and 1943) for specific industries 
with data available. The table documents dramatic increases in turnover 
in  this subsample of  industries, including several essential  to  the  war 
effort (e.g., shipbuilding, autos, and aircraft). 
In spite of  this  evidence,  however, there  are reasons  to doubt that 
bureaucratic controls resulted directly or even principally from turnover 
per se. Essential industries varied considerably in their turnover rates, yet 
bureaucratic personnel practices flourished  in most of  those industries 
during the war. Moreover, some industries exhibiting the highest rates of 
turnover were no more likely than average to adopt personnel practices 
ing industries, where institutional pressures on organizational structures are less in- 
tense than elsewhere in the economy. American Journal of  Sociology 
TABLE 3 
Industry  1940  1943 
Aircraft  ................. 4.12 
Auto  ....................  2.84 
Cotton manufacturing  .....  3.82 
Electrical machinery  ......  2.19 
Glass  ................... 1.74 
Iron and steel  ............  1.68 
Machinery ............... 2.55 
Shipbuilding ............. 1.53 
Silk and rayon  ...........  1.43 
All industries*  ......... 3.2  2 
SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics (1941, p.  169; 
1943, p.  1241). 
* The figures for all industries pertain to the entire econ- 
omy, including some industries not listed above. 
directly aimed at reducing turnover. Despite high turnover, for instance, 
firms in shipbuilding and glass apparently did not rely heavily on morale 
surveys, exit interviews, or service insignias (NICB 1947, p. 32). Rather, 
as we  discuss  below,  the federal  government selectively  intervened in 
certain industries,  including  shipbuilding, to  stabilize  employment  by 
mandating or encouraging the adoption of certain bureaucratic practices. 
In other words, government policies constrained firms' responses to turn- 
over, and the politics of  labor mobility, defined largely by the state, may 
have been more decisive than the economics of  mobility during this pe- 
riod. Jacoby (1984) has made a similar point about World War I, namely, 
that the federal government fostered norms about "acceptable"  turnover 
levels, which were couched in the rhetoric of  national security interests. 
In sum, organizational scale and turnover were not ineluctable impera- 
tives shaping employment relations.  To the extent that new methods of 
personnel administration were adopted more in large firms and in firms 
with high turnover, we argue that this was largely because certain institu- 
tional pressures favoring adoption were strongest in those settings. We 
show  below  how  the federal government  helped  define  the  "turnover 
problem," mandating some innovations in the employment relation and 
selectively encouraging others.  We  also  focus on the role of  personnel 
professionals in fostering bureaucratization during and after World War 
11.  First,  however,  we  briefly  summarize what our analyses indicate 
about unions, another key constituency influencing personnel administra- 
tion during this period. War and Peace 
Unionization.-Passage  of  the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932), the Na- 
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA; 1933), the Wagner Act (1935), and 
subsequent legislation encouraged unionization and strengthened unions' 
impact on the organization of  work and employment. Writers of  diverse 
perspectives  have argued that employers responded  by developing bu- 
reaucratic personnel practices to thwart unionization and quell labor un- 
rest. For instance, neo-Marxists, such as Gordon et al. (1982), have re- 
cently linked unionization to changes in the employment relationship. In 
particular,  they argue that technical controls used  in  mass-production 
industries fueled industrial unionism  after passage  of  the Wagner Act 
because  workers  reacted  hostilely  to those practices.1° This prompted 
management, in turn, to experiment with new bureaucratic techniques 
that made labor control appear more "natural," impersonal, and in work- 
ers' interests (Gordon et al. 1982, chap. 5; Edwards 1979, p. 128). While 
our  aggregated  data may  obscure  the  interplay  of  unionization  and 
changes in the employment relationship, we can investigate some general 
connections that have been posited between the labor movement and the 
evolution of  personnel practices during this period. 
The NICB data are consistent with the claim that scientific manage- 
ment  and  industrial unionism  were  linked.  There are  positive  cross- 
sectional relationships between the usage of  time and motion studies and 
the prevalence of  CIO unionization across manufacturing industries in 
1939 and  1946 (r,  =  .43 and r,  = .26, respectively).  To examine the 
hypothesized link between technical control and industrial unionism fol- 
lowing  the Wagner  Act, we regressed  the percentage of  firms in each 
manufacturing industry reporting CIO agreements in  1939 on the per- 
centage using time and motion studies in 1935. We also controlled for the 
percentage  reporting trade union  agreements in  1935, which  captures 
secular trends in unionization across industries. The OLS results in table 
4 show that the prevalence of  time and motion studies in an industry in 
1935 had a sizable positive  effect on the percentage of  firms organized 
there by the CIO in  1939, even when prior unionization  levels are con- 
trolled for. '' 
Unionization also increased during this period in industries where tech- 
nical controls, such as time and motion studies, were not widely adopted. 
For example, leather, paper, and glass all registered  large increases in 
lo Similarly,  Piore  (1982, p.  9)  argues  that  "to  a  very  large  extent,  the  practice 
of  American industrial unionism has come to rest upon, indeed to presuppose, Tay- 
lorism." 
l' If  the  1935 and 1939 disturbances are autocorrelated, then the OLS estimates in 
table 4 may be biased. Since there is a moderate negative correlation between the two 
independent variables (r = -  .38), table 4 may overstate slightly the effect of  1935 
time and motion studies on 1939 CIO unionism (see Hannan and Young 1977, p. 66). American Journal of  Sociology 
TABLE 4 
IMPACT  OF  TECHNICAL  CONTROL  AND  UNIONIZATION  IN  1935 ON  PREVALENCE  OF  CIO 
UNIONISM:  MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES,  1939 (OLS Estimates) 
Variable  Metric Effect  t  Standardized Effect 
Intercept  ...................... 
1935 time and motion (%) ........ 
1935 unionization (%)  ........... 
No~~.-see  text for explanation of  variables. N  = 19; RZ  =  ,318; fiz  =  ,233 
union membership during the  1930s (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975, 
p.  177). Welfare work, technical control, and bureaucratic employment 
practices were less commonplace  there than in other industries (NICB 
1936, 1940). Instead, "simple control," based on paternalism and occupa- 
tional traditions, seems to have governed many firms in these craft indus- 
tries, and increased unionization in the 1930s was not directly attribut- 
able  to  employee  reaction  against  early  experiments  with  scientific 
managementL2  Unions  in  these  industries,  moreover,  were  affiliated 
primarily  with the AF of  L, rather than with the industrially oriented 
CIO. 
Gordon et al.  (1982, pp.  180-82)  have also  claimed that increasing 
unionism prompted a period of  employer exploration of new bureaucratic 
control systems in the prewar era. The NICB data suggest that if unioni- 
zation pressures in the 1930s fueled this exploration, employers' responses 
were neither immediate nor uniform. Although table 1 documents some 
increases among manufacturing firms in the prevalence of  selected bu- 
reaucratic personnel practices by  1939 (compared with the years before 
the Wagner Act), there is little evidence of  an immediate or widespread 
bureaucratization of  employment in response to increased unionization 
activity in the 1930s. For instance, in those sectors with a high percentage 
of  firms using time and motion studies (e.g., autos, electrical manufac- 
turing,  rubber)-industries  where  worker  hostility  was  supposedly 
most intense-there  were no large increases between  1935 and 1939 in 
the prevalence of  such bureaucratic controls as personnel departments, 
employment and promotion  testing,  job  analysis and evaluation,  and 
rating systems (see table 1).  l3 This suggests either that any "threat" effects 
l2 It is likely, e.g., that hardships experienced by laborers in the Depression and the 
impetus of labor legislation, which cut across all industries, contributed to the organi- 
zation of  craft workers in this period (Bernstein 1970, p. 218). 
l3 In fact, some industries actually exhibit small declines in  the prevalence  of  some 
practices during this period, although this is probably due to sampling error and an 
imperfect correspondence between the measures of  some practices in  1935 and 1939 
(see notes to table 1). War and Peace 
of  unionization  pressures  occurred  earlier  or  else  that  employers'  re- 
sponses to the labor movement were indeed so exploratory at this point 
that there was no conspicuous trend within and across industries by 1939. 
Unionization apparently did have a rapid and pervasive effect on the 
employment relationship by diffusing seniority provisions through writ- 
ten  agreements  in unionized  enterprises or  announced  policy in  other 
settings.  According to table  1, over 80% of  firms sampled in the auto 
industry, 79% in agricultural implements, 70% in electrical manufactur- 
ing, and 63% in rubber had seniority provisions in place by 1939. These 
same industries were also heavily organized by the CIO during the pre- 
ceding period  (Bernstein  1970; Fine 1969). Not surprisingly, there is a 
strong relationship between the prevalence of  these seniority provisions 
(either in written agreements or as announced corporate policy) and in- 
dustrial unionism in 1939 (r, = .55 in all industries and .45 in manufac- 
turing).  l4 
Unfortunately, the NICB data do not provide information on seniority 
arrangements before  1939 in order to assess their growth in the wake of 
the Wagner Act and similar legislation. However, the historical literature 
of this period underscores the stake that labor and management perceived 
that they had in developing seniority-related policies in response to that 
pro-union  legislation.  Industrial  labor  wanted  formalized  promotion 
policies that used seniority as the sole basis of  advancement to protect 
against retaliation  for  affiliating with  unions  or  against the  biases  of 
company  foremen  (Harbison  1939, p.  32;  1941, p.  37).  Management 
wished to retain control over hiring,  promotions, and firing but recog- 
nized the need to negotiate with labor. Managers therefore sought to draft 
seniority policies that also included loyalty and ability as requirements, 
thereby preserving discretion over employment (Bernstein 1970, pp. 464- 
68,  792; Stone 1974, p.  113). As a result, policies establishing seniority 
rights spread to many firms, even though their specific contents varied 
(Fine 1969, pp. 181, 324). 
World  War I1 increased  this process of  negotiation  and adjustment 
between  labor and management.  The government pressured unions to 
maintain domestic peace,  and unions  informally agreed to limit work 
stoppages, allowing the National War Labor Board to arbitrate union- 
management conflicts (Bernstein 1970, p. 729; Sweeney 1956, pp. 52-58). 
l4  Unionization during this period also fostered several other specific personnel prac- 
tices, particularly the use of  industrywide comparisons for job rates (NICB 1940, p. 
20). Unions had long complained about wage differences among companies and re- 
gions for jobs that were essentially the same. In steel and auto, union agreements with 
the leading firms established benchmarks for negotiations with smaller organizations 
(Bernstein 1970, pp. 481, 553; Fine 1969, p.  329). American Journal of  Sociology 
Moreover, specialized personnel  subunits devoted to maintaining har- 
monious  labor  relations  flourished  during  the  war  in  such  highly 
unionized sectors as communications, transportation, utilities, shipbuild- 
ing,  petroleum,  aircraft,  rubber,  and autos  (see  NICB  1947,  p.  16; 
Kochan and Cappelli 1984). Unions in essential war industries therefore 
were  more receptive  to some personnel innovations instituted by firms 
and by  the state to regulate  the wartime economy than they had been 
before the war. 
There was less accommodation on the part of  AF of  L unions to em- 
ployers'  use of  modern personnel practices.  Many AF of  L unions had 
resisted  earlier  efforts  at technical  control,  which  were  perceived  as 
weakening craftworkers' discretion over their trades (see Stark 1980).15 
Industries organized along AF of  L lines also appear less likely to have 
explored the newer bureaucratic controls that diffused widely elsewhere 
by the end of  World War 11. For instance, the prevalence of  job  eval- 
uation systems in  1946 was inversely related to the degree of  AF of  L pres- 
ence in manufacturing industries (r,  = -  .54). Manufacturing industries 
with  a  strong AF of  L  presence  were  also  significantly  less likely  to 
exhibit widespread usage of  personnel departments even as late as 1946 
(r, =  -.34). 
In sum, our analyses provide some support for theoretical perspectives 
that link unionization  with the evolution of  technical and bureaucratic 
control in U.S. industry. However, it is clearly difficult to determine from 
these data whether industrial unions were "co-opted"  by management's 
experiments in personnel administration or to estimate precisely the mag- 
nitude of  unions' influence  on changes in  the employment  relationship 
during this period. As  we  have seen, management sometimes adopted 
and  extended  specialized  personnel  activities  even  in  the  absence  of 
unions or proximate union threats, especially in the nonmanufacturing 
sector (see, e.g., banking, insurance, and trade in table 1). Also, unions 
genuinely perceived many of these innovations to be beneficial. The same 
seniority systems that provided firms with convenient bases for adminis- 
tering rewards also protected industrial workers from layoffs and capri- 
cious treatment. Thus, unions and bureaucratic arrangements may have 
been  complementary  means  of  controlling  workers  in  many  instances 
(particularly in CIO industries), rather than alternatives, as Pfeffer and 
Cohen (1984) have suggested. Increased accommodation  between labor 
and management during this period aided the diffusion of modern person- 
'' In 1939 and 1946, the percentage of  firms with AF of  L agreements was negatively 
correlated with the prevalence of  time and motion studies (for 1939, r, = -  .31 for 
manufacturing and r, = -  .24 for all industries; for 1946, the correlations are -  .75 
and -  .20, respectively). War and Peace 
nel  innovations.  This  accommodation  was  largely  due  to  a  unique 
stimulus that has been underemphasized in recent discussions of  bureau- 
cratic  control: World  War I1  and the government intervention  that it 
occasioned. 
The federal  government  and  World War 11.-World  War I1 brought 
greater federal intervention in labor relations and employment than ever 
before.  The War Production  Board (WPB), War Labor Board (WLB), 
and War Manpower Commission (WMC) engaged in unprecedented gov- 
ernment manipulation of  labor markets, union activities, and personnel 
practices. These interventions had two overlapping effects. First, govern- 
ment often mandated general models or requirements for bureaucratizing 
employment. For example, early WPB policies sought to reduce turnover 
and  wage  competition  by  standardizing  employment  conditions  in 
volatile industries  such  as shipbuilding.  Here the  government  helped 
develop and diffuse specific models of personnel management. Second, in 
many cases,  government interventions encouraged firms to adopt their 
own particular bureaucratic controls.  For instance, later WPB policies 
involved regional employment stabilization plans to control turnover and 
wages. In effect, these plans encouraged firms to expand personnel func- 
tions in order to document their labor needs vis-8-vis other firms and 
industries. In this section, we document how government interventions 
fueled the development of  bureaucratic controls by creating models of 
employment and incentives to formalize and expand personnel functions. 
An employment-stabilization plan introduced in shipbuilding in  1941 
illustrates how the state attempted to limit competition among firms for 
employees, which had been producing high turnover and wage inflation, 
by developing a bureaucratic model of  personnel  relations for an entire 
industry. In southern California, the creation of  large shipbuilding and 
aerospace industries  within the same labor market wreaked  havoc on 
both industries (Gray 1943, p.  7).  In April  1941, the National Defense 
Advisory Committee, predecessor of the WLB, organized a conference of 
management and labor representatives from the Pacific shipbuilding in- 
dustry.  Guidelines  concerning wages,  hours, shift work, strike avoid- 
ance, and apprentice training were adopted (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics  194  1, p.  1162). These guidelines  effectively standardized industry 
work  arrangements  and  working  conditions  to  prevent  "pirating"  of 
workers. Similarly, in June  1942, the building trades unions agreed to a 
WLB proposal to stabilize wage rates on all federal projects. Though less 
complex, this agreement had the same effect as the shipbuilding stabiliza- 
tion plan: drastically reducing turnover and wage competition by creating 
a standard model of  employment relations within the industry. Jacoby 
has suggested that governmental intervention during World War I had a 
similar effect (1985, pp. 140-47). American Journal of  Sociology 
Later, WPB employment-stabilization efforts followed a different pat- 
tern; stabilization  plans in lumber  and nonferrous  metals  mining,  for 
instance, controlled labor mobility directly. In contrast to the shipbuild- 
ing  controls,  which  limited competition  among employers,  these  new 
plans limited employee mobility. Like the shipbuilding industry, lumber 
and nonferrous mining companies faced increased wartime demand ac- 
companied by labor shortages and rising  turnover, and these trends in 
product  and labor  markets made government  intervention both  more 
necessary and more palatable (U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1942, p. 
713). The U.S. Employment Service, then under WPB control, required 
that a worker departing from a job  have a  certificate of  separation to 
work elsewhere. This document certified that the separation was in the 
"best interests of  the war effort" (U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1942, 
p. 235). Likewise, employers could dismiss workers only for gross miscon- 
duct. Male employees leaving jobs without authorization were subject to 
immediate reclassification  by the Selective  Service into an active-duty 
category and then drafted. 
This system was later extended to control regional labor markets across 
other industries.  By November  1943, the WMC had implemented  78 
local employment-stabilization  plans in areas with labor shortages, fol- 
lowing the same certification guidelines discussed above. Further, in mid- 
1944, the WPB established an employment-ceiling program whereby re- 
gional manpower directors set "the maximum number of  . . . specified 
types of employees which an establishment may have in its employ during 
a specified period" (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1944, p. 749). Low- 
priority industries, such as retail trade, were forced to release workers 
(U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1945, p. 535), while high-priority indus- 
tries, such as aircraft, were allocated more positions.  Meanwhile, Em- 
ployment Service procedures for referring in-migrants were tightened to 
prevent those leaving shortage areas from obtaining employment in non- 
shortage areas. In this way, the "certificate of availability" program was 
nationalized, and employers had to justify their labor needs not only vis- 
a-vis other local employers but in relation to all U.S. industry. The Selec- 
tive  Service also aided in labor market manipulation  by  changing the 
draft deferment status of positions as staffing shortages changed. Workers 
in nonessential industries and occupations often had to choose between 
finding jobs in more essential settings and going to war (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 1943, p. 468). 
Firms were therefore compelled to initiate or expand personnel depart- 
ments to document their needs. Because employers had to classify jobs by 
skill and wage categories to satisfy the new national stabilization plans, 
job analysis and evaluation flourished (Walters 1945, pp. 10-1 I), as doc- 
umented in table 1. The government also required firms to file "manning War and Peace 
tables"  detailing  skill  and manpower  needs  and encouraged  them  to 
enumerate jobs in terms of new Dictionary of  Occupational Titles (DOT) 
guidelines (U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1945, pp. 419-20).  Thus, the 
government encouraged the formalization of work roles and the diffusion 
of  standard job  definitions  across firms by providing employers with a 
free and easily accessible job-analysis  system. Other reporting require- 
ments necessitated  employment and turnover records, rating and salary 
classification  systems,  and  promotion  paths  reflecting  skill  gradients 
among jobs-all  designed to aid the war effort by ensuring maximum 
utilization of human resources within and among firms. Companies with- 
out competent personnel departments were hard-pressed to justify  their 
staffing requirements, and firms that had not previously done so moved 
quickly to implement or augment personnel  departments, job  analysis 
and evaluation systems, wage surveys, and manpower analyses to sub- 
stantiate their labor needs. 
Federal hiring controls, combined with high turnover rates, also fos- 
tered efforts to lengthen employment relationships. Seniority provisions, 
exit interviews, stabilization  plans,  turnover  records,  and service  em- 
blems were increasingly adopted, all designed to reduce exits and bind 
workers to firms. For instance, between  1939 and 1946, the existence of 
seniority provisions increased from 58% to 83% in companies with 250 or 
more employees in a period of  full employment, and the use of  service 
emblems increased from 23% to 40% in the same firms (see table 1). These 
practices were clearly adopted to maintain worker loyalty. 
Several other government programs fostered additional personnel prac- 
tices.  The Fair Labor Standards Act  of  1942 required firms to record 
wages and hours for every employee (Jacoby  1984, p. 53). In the Basic 
Guide  for  Labor-Management  Committees  (WPB  1945~)~  labor- 
management committees and personnel departments were encouraged to 
study absenteeism and turnover and to institute exit interviews, training 
programs,  and safety programs. Through its training efforts, the WPB 
developed manuals on job  instruction and promoted job  analysis (WPB 
1942,  sec.  2).  It  also  actively  encouraged  wage  incentive  plans 
(WPB 1945b) and suggestion systems (WPB 1943), further increasing the 
size and duties of  personnel departments. 
The War Labor Board was another important source of  models for 
personnel  management.  It ruled  on  numerous  grievances  brought  by 
labor unions during the war, and its decisions established precedents that 
set the standards for labor-management relations. Thus, the board's rul- 
ings and solutions spread quickly across industries. In many instances, 
the WLB initiated solutions to problems that had long preceded the war. 
In iron and steel, for example, a resurgence of  unionization  after 1937 
significantly increased the number of  grievances concerning wage ineq- American Journal of  Sociology 
uities, which were not arbitrable under prevailing steel agreements. Man- 
agement too  was  dissatisfied  with  the  unsystematic  administration of 
wage policies in the industry. Thus, both parties had an interest in sys- 
tematizing and formalizing jobs and rewards, but little progress had been 
made. The WLB served as a major impetus for change. Workers' griev- 
ances were referred to that agency during the war, and labor and man- 
agement were ordered to eliminate wage inequities within plants. At the 
same time, various companies organized the Cooperative Wage Survey 
during the war to develop proposals  for job  evaluation and systematic 
wage administration in iron and steel. The bulk of this plan was incorpo- 
rated into bargaining agreements made after the war. Some inequities 
were eliminated, but many other discrepancies in wages and incentive 
pay were institutionalized (Elbaum 1984; Steiber 1959). 
In short, the  war occasioned cooperative arrangements among steel 
companies, under pressure from the WLB, which served as catalysts for 
the 1947 job evaluation system. These agreements, which were industry- 
wide  and  uniformly  applied,  institutionalized  historical  distinctions 
among jobs and framed the contemporary reward system in the industry. 
Labor viewed the new system as consistent with their aim of  eradicating 
capricious wage differentials, while steel companies saw the changes as 
systematizing and streamlining employment practices. 
According to one wartime study, the same process occurred in southern 
California's aircraft industry (Gray 1943). Wartime demand encouraged 
the standardization  of  aircraft work,  which  reduced  training require- 
ments.  Consequently, new  workers resented  the higher  pay  of  senior 
workers because the former perceived no relationship between seniority 
and levels of  performance. Conversely, some older workers entering the 
industry to replace draftees resented higher earnings among younger (but 
more experienced) employees. Workers were thus interested in seeing job 
requirements and rewards  rationalized. Management  was  also  clearly 
interested  in  systematizing  personnel  practices  across  firms during the 
war because  consistent  policies  would  reduce  competition  from  other 
local firms and offset differences among the various unions representing 
employees  of  the major defense  contractors.  In addition,  the  aircraft 
companies quickly recognized the longer-term benefits of these changes in 
personnel administration: streamlining and standardizing job definitions; 
reducing duplication and facilitating wage surveys; centralizing employ- 
ment procedures and aiding in securing workers from the Employment 
Service, who used  the same DOT categories to classify jobs  as did the 
aircraft companies; and assisting in training by improving information on 
job requirements (Gray 1943, pp.  18-20). 
Consequently, unions  and management complied with  a  1943 WLB 
order for job  evaluation and wage systematization  in the local aircraft War and Peace 
industry. One union chairman promoted the plan to his constituents as 
follows: "The purpose of  the plan is to obtain a better relation of  rate to 
job. . . . [It] is not to lower rates of certain employees. Those who are now 
being paid rates that are out of  line because  they are too high  can be 
transferred to work which has a higher value. Those who are now under- 
paid will be classified upwards. In an industry that is growing like air- 
craft, constantly improving its methods of production in order to turn out 
more  planes  for  national  defense, job  evaluation is  never  completed" 
(cited in  Gray  1943, pp.  75-76).  This quotation illustrates how World 
War I1 created a transcendent, extraorganizational interest that overrode 
potential conflicts between labor and management. (It has also been sug- 
gested that unions looked favorably on job evaluation because, with wage 
levels frozen, job  reclassification was often the only way for workers to 
secure pay increases.) Both parties perceived benefits to be had by accept- 
ing  bureaucratic controls mandated directly or indirectly by the state. 
The costs were accepted as regrettable but inevitable concomitants of the 
war effort.  To be  sure, the labor shortages and high product demand 
created by the war made governmental intervention not only necessary 
but also more acceptable to all concerned. 
In sum, federal activities during the war fostered bureaucratization of 
employment in  two ways.  First, early employment-stabilization plans, 
WLB rulings,  and WPB publications  provided  models of  employment 
practices that often  extended to entire industries or sets of  industries, 
thereby  encouraging  isomorphism  among firms.  Second,  regional  sta- 
bilization  plans,  Selective  Service  activities,  the  new  DOT,  and  the 
government-led movement to reduce turnover provided strong incentives 
for firms to establish or extend personnel departments that could analyze 
and justify  labor needs and institute bureaucratic mechanisms to reduce 
turnover. The bureaucratization of employment during this period may, 
as Bendix (1956, chap. 3) has argued, reflect a broader process of  societal 
rationalization accompanying the advent of  large-scale economic enter- 
prise. However, we believe that the tendency for bureaucratic controls to 
arise first in large firms (and those with high turnover) had a great deal to 
do with the fact that these organizations were most visible to government 
agencies monitoring manpower developments during World War 11. Af- 
terward, labor, management, and government discovered new interests 
that were served by many arrangements and practices that had developed 
during the war. These innovations became institutionalized and gradu- 
ally diffused to other firms and industries, owing largely to the activities 
of personnel professionals. 
The  personnel  profession  and  the  postwar  period.-Gordon  et al. 
(1982), Edwards (1979), and others have characterized the period from 
the end of  World War I1 to the mid-1970s as one of  "consolidation,"  in American Journal of  Sociology 
which  earlier  labor-management  conflicts  were  supplanted  by  mutual 
accommodation to new bureaucratic control systems. The role of  person- 
nel administrators in this process of  consolidation is documented in the 
postwar literature on personnel management (also see Harris 1982, chap. 
6). At first, there was fear among personnel managers that their depart- 
ments would  be  dismantled after the armistice, as had happened after 
World War I. For example, a 1946 NICB report surveyed the organiza- 
tion  of  personnel  functions  in  10 model  companies,  stating that "war 
industries were purposely avoided [in the report] . . . those in which large 
personnel  organizations  had  sprung  into  being  overnight  and which 
might be reduced as suddenly with the anticipated cutback of  employ- 
ment at the conclusion of  the war" (NICB 1946b, pp. 5-6;  see also Kush- 
nick 1944, p. 6; Silberman 1983, pp. 59-67). 
Consequently, discussions  of  the "reconversion  of  personnel"  began 
appearing in such practitioner-oriented  journals as Personnel Adminis- 
tration and Personnel Journal even  before  the end of  the  war  (e.g., 
Fredenburgh 1944; Kirkpatrick  1945b; Kushnick 1945). Personnel spe- 
cialists seized on particular problems associated with the conversion to a 
peacetime economy, such as the physical and mental disabilities  of  re- 
turning  veterans.  Furthermore,  labor  surpluses intensified  the impor- 
tance of  choosing qualified individuals from the large pool  of  workers 
available for a limited number of jobs. Personnel administrators therefore 
emphasized their past and present expertise in developing selection and 
evaluation procedures (Hayes 1945; McQuitty 1947; Zerba 1945, p. 115). 
Reconversion problems would not last forever, however, and personnel 
functionaries sought a more permanent justification  of  their role.  They 
emphasized two themes: productivity and labor relations. After the war, 
veterans preference  policies  and built-in  wage increases negotiated  by 
unions during wartime required management to pay higher wages with- 
out regard to labor's  productivity. At the same time, many companies 
experienced lower  postwar  sales  owing  to declining U.S.  demand for 
durables. Many companies therefore sought to tie wages directly to pro- 
ductivity, keeping the level of demand high through foreign trade (NICB 
1946~).  Personnel managers were quick to claim sole expertise in measur- 
ing productivity and in  determining appropriate rewards through job 
classification and evaluation as well as worker testing and rating proce- 
dures (Kirkpatrick 1945a; Tyerman 1945, p. 78; Wallace 1946, pp.  18- 
20). 
Labor relations also were of  paramount concern immediately after the 
war. Manpower surpluses and decreased demand for durables threatened 
labor's ability to negotiate wage and benefit increases. Moreover, veter- 
ans preference  programs  created  conflicts  within  firms  that required 
labor-management arbitration. Management saw these difficulties as a War and Peace 
way to regain some of  the control lost in the late thirties and during the 
war (e.g., Sweeney 1956, pp. 62-68;  Harris 1982). Many companies es- 
tablished new wage and hiring policies; not surprisingly, unions resisted. 
Strike activity increased far above wartime levels, with the number of 
man-days idle tripling from 1945 to 1946 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
1947, table E-1). The federal government intervened in 1947 by passing 
the Taft-Hartley Act,  which  eliminated some union  prerogatives,  but 
firms were still under strong pressure to negotiate with labor. Numerous 
articles appeared in the personnel journals at this time discussing ways to 
present worker grievances to management, and personnel managers were 
touted  as  intermediaries  in  labor-management  negotiations  (Ashivin 
1946, pp. 233-38;  Jones 1945; Scott, Deadrick, and Taylor 1983; Kochan 
and Cappelli 1984). 
Personnel workers also sought to strengthen their positions by forging a 
stronger professional identity, as they had tried to do earlier in the cen- 
tury (Jacoby 1985, chap. 4). Again,  the applied literature on personnel 
administration  highlights  this  trend.  Several  periodicals  devoted  in- 
creased attention to the requirements for creating a profession (e.g., Na- 
tional Roster of  Scientific and Specialized Personnel 1946; vols. 27-28  of 
Personnel Journal;  vol.  8 of  Personnel Administration). In addition to 
discussing  professional  education  and  credentialing procedures,  these 
journals covered meetings of  personnel associations and encouraged de- 
bate and communication in an evolving professional network.  For ex- 
ample, Personnel Administration reported the activities of  the Society of 
Personnel Administration. The society, founded in 1937 by  17 members 
of the federal Civil Service, had already grown to more than 650 members 
by 1945 and to more than 1,850 members by 1951 (Carlson 1945, p. 19; 
Goode 1951, p. 58). 
As  personnel  work  became  professionalized  and personnel  practices 
were institutionalized, the profession grew rapidly. The number of  per- 
sonnel and labor relations professionals in the United States increased 
from fewer than 30,000 in 1946 to 53,000 in 1950 and 93,000 in 1960; in 
comparison,  the  professional  work  force  as  a  whole  increased  from 
3,879,000 in 1940 to about 5,000,000 in 1950 to 7,336,000 in 1960 (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1949, p. 107; U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975, 
pp. 140-41). Thus, in percentage terms, the growth rate of the personnel 
profession far outstripped the growth rate of  other professions (and of  the 
U.S. labor force as a whole) during the postwar years. 
Once adopted, bureaucratic employment practices survived despite en- 
vironmental changes, which is consistent with theories of  organizational 
inertia (Stinchcombe 1965; Hannan and Freeman 1984). They also served 
as models for new or peripheral firms in an industry that were entreated 
through publications such as those of  the NICB to adopt these state-of- American Journal of  Sociology 
the-art practices.  Some evidence of  the inertia of  bureaucratic personnel 
practices,  albeit from an earlier period, is provided by the  1935 NICB 
survey, which asked firms about active and recently discontinued person- 
nel  activities. The two sections of  table 5 summarize some illustrative 
data from this survey. Organizations frequently abandoned various wel- 
fare and benefit programs in response to the Depression (upper section). 
However, as Brody (1980, chap. 2) has noted, efforts to systematize and 
regularize employment activities were rarely abandoned (lower section).  l6 
Similarly,  1953 NICB data suggest that such innovations as personnel 
departments, salary classification systems, merit rating plans, and exit 
interviews all persisted, diffusing from larger to smaller companies after 
the war (NICB 1954). For example, 79% of the firms surveyed across all 
industries in 1953 reported having a central personnel department, com- 
pared with 63% in 1946, and among firms with 250 or fewer employees 
45% had personnel departments in 1953, compared with 30% seven years 
earlier. Merit rating plans also became more popular, increasing from 
28% in  1946 across all industries to 45% in 1953 and from 20% to 30% 
among companies with fewer than 250 employees. 
Thus,  despite  changing  environmental  circumstances,  bureaucratic 
controls over employment persisted  and spread. Obviously, there were 
also important continuities in firms' environments favoring the retention 
of these personnel innovations. In particular, various government report- 
ing requirements and programs established earlier remained in place- 
including unemployment insurance, safety regulations, and pension pro- 
grams-necessitating  ongoing  data collection  and research  efforts  by 
personnel specialists. These governmental activities also established pre- 
cedents for subsequent state interventions into employment matters such 
as the safety, social welfare, civil rights, and affirmative action programs 
of  the last three  decades,  extending further the  territory  of  personnel 
specialists. 
Of course, it is difficult to know how successful personnel specialists 
were  in their postwar efforts  to  secure organizational power  and gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of  management (see Silberman  1983). The rapid 
growth and professionalization of  personnel work may reflect the success 
of  personnel  functionaries in applying long-standing solutions to ever- 
changing problems, as illustrated by the persistence of  bureaucratic em- 
ployment practices that we documented above and by the recent revival 
of  such techniques as job evaluation to effect pay equity. Some investiga- 
tors may have interpreted the flurry of personnel activity and professional 
l6 A survey of  somewhat larger companies in  Ohio between  1929 and 1936 revealed 
similar results (although welfare practices  were dropped less frequently among these 
larger corporations), concluding that the new "personnel methods and plans . . . seem 
to have stood the test of  the depression"  (Parks 1936, p. 39). War and Peace 
TABLE 5 
ADOPTION  AND DISCONTINUATION  OF  VARIOUS  PERSONNEL  BENEFITS 
AND PROGRAMS.  1935 (%) 
% of  Firms with 
Program (N = 2. 452)  Programs Discontinued* 
Benefit programs: 
Bonus.  attendance  ............. 
Bonus.  service  ................. 
Profit sharing  .................. 
Suggestion system  .............. 
Savings plan  .................. 
Employee magazine  ............ 
Cafeterialrestaurant  ............ 
Athletic program  ............... 
Picnics or outings  .............. 
Christmas gifts  ................ 
Dances  ....................... 
Programs systematizing employment: 
Centralized employment  ........ 
Turnover records  .............. 
Layoff procedure ............... 
Maximum hiring age  ........... 
Personnel department ........... 
Employment records ............ 
Rule books  .................... 
Job analysis  ................... 
Job specification  ............... 
Systematic promotion  ........... 
Salary classification ............. 
Rating system  ................. 
Employment tests  .............. 
Time and motion study  ......... 
SOURCE.-NICB  (1936,  chap  . 2)  . 
* Entries reflect programs discontinued  since 1927 as a percentage of  active programs in 1935  . 
identity crises after World War I1 as signals indicating the birth of  "bu- 
reaucratic control" (e.g., Gordon et al  . 1982)  . In contrast. our analyses 
suggest that the new system of control was well in place by the end of the 
war and that personnel  workers had strong organizational  and profes- 
sional interests in redefining. extending. and calling greater attention to 
their activities in the postwar era  . 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Students of  labor markets and of  organizations share an interest in the 
origins of  bureaucratic employment practices . Most accounts of  bureau- American Journal of  Sociology 
cratization point to either efficiency or control functions served by formal 
personnel structures. Indeed, we have summarized some evidence consis- 
tent with those theories. For instance, differences across industries in firm 
size and turnover rates are associated with differences in personnel prac- 
tices, as are rates of unionization. In our view, however, both efficiency 
and control arguments are limited in accounting for the evolution and 
diffusion of  modern  employment relations.  Our analyses highlight the 
importance of government intervention in that process during World War 
11,  a factor usually treated primarily as a residual. Our conclusions are 
consistent with a study of  recent practices by  Dobbin et al. (in press), 
which finds that the organizations that are most progressive in creating 
affirmative action programs and grievance systems are the ones receiving 
the most scrutiny from the state. As it did during World War 11, govern- 
ment intervention has wrought fundamental changes in contemporary 
human resource  management. The state has repeatedly established the 
boundaries within which managerial imperatives, whether of  efficiency 
or social control, shape employment and opportunity (see Burawoy 1983). 
Stark has made a similar argument about state intervention during World 
War I, claiming that it "created the market conditions in which capitalists 
could adopt many of  the schemes of  the scientific management move- 
ment" (1980, p.  110, emphasis added). 
To be sure, the rudiments of  bureaucratic control were already estab- 
lished early in the 20th century (Jacoby 1985). However, we have argued 
that government agencies fostered a widespread diffusion of  personnel 
innovations during World War I1 by mandating specific models of  em- 
ployment, by providing incentives for organizations to create or expand 
personnel departments and bureaucratic controls, and by providing a set 
of  overarching interests that prompted labor-management accommoda- 
tion. After the war, these personnel innovations were used in the pursuit 
of  other interests by labor and management. Also, organizational inertia 
and the professionalization of  personnel administration institutionalized 
many bureaucratic controls in peacetime that had proliferated before and 
during the war. 
Our results have several implications  for  organizational  theory.  For 
instance, they inspire conjectures about the role of  crises in institutional 
change. In periods of crises, such as wars, stable institutions are suscepti- 
ble to revolutionary change. In a sense, crises recreate some "liabilities of 
newness,"  encouraging managers to catch up with modern  organizing 
techniques and reorient their organizations (Stinchcombe 1965). New so- 
lutions, in turn, develop their own inertia until challenged by future crises 
(Krasner 1984). 
Our findings are also consistent with the predictions of  institutionaliza- War and Peace 
tion theorists about how and where bureaucratic innovations diffuse. The 
evidence presented here supports Tolbert and Zucker's (1983) thesis that 
the spread of  new organizational practices is strongly linked to internal 
functional requirements only in the earlier stages of  diffusion.  Between 
1939 and  1946, bureaucratic  personnel  practices  spread  from  newer, 
high-turnover  industries with larger firms (such as auto and rubber) to 
older,  more  stable industries with  smaller firms  (such  as leather and 
lumber). To some extent, this process of  diffusion was under way even 
before  the  war:  bureaucratic  controls  had  already spread  from  early 
manufacturing innovators-typically,  large firms with high turnover-to 
banking, insurance, and other nonmanufacturing sectors, which tradi- 
tionally had lower rates of turnover and smaller organizational units (see 
Piore  1983, p. 33). Thus, government intervention during wartime may 
have merely  hastened  trends  to  the  bureaucratization of  employment. 
This early and rapid diffusion of bureaucratic controls to nonmanufactur- 
ing organizations may reflect the fact that, as institutional theorists note, 
legitimacy  in such settings often depends on adopting procedures that 
instill confidence and establish continuity and the semblance of  rational- 
ity (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
By diffusing state-of-the-art  personnel  practices throughout the econ- 
omy, government agencies, unions, and personnel professionals have at- 
tenuated (or at least complicated) the impact of organization-level charac- 
teristics on the employment relationship.  That is, bureaucratic controls 
have diffused across organizations that differ in age, size, technology, and 
other dimensions that are frequently claimed to affect personnel prac- 
tices.  The  state,  unions,  and  personnel  professionals  are  important 
sources of  equifinality in organizational  arrangements, prompting  very 
different enterprises to exhibit similar employment relations. 
We do not mean to imply that such firm-level considerations as scale, 
turnover, and labor unrest were unimportant in shaping modern person- 
nel systems; indeed, we have alluded to their effects throughout. Nor do 
we wish to suggest that management and labor were thoroughly passive 
recipients of edicts from above. We do, however, take issue with perspec- 
tives  that trace changes in  the employment relationship to ineluctable 
imperatives shaping organizational behavior, whether those perspectives 
refer to surplus-expropriating capitalists, profit-maximizing managers, or 
utility-maximizing laborers. Such accounts are reductionistic and overly 
simplistic.  By  sanctioning  modern  employment  practices  and by  en- 
couraging the diffusion  of  those practices throughout the economy, the 
state has played a major role in the spread of  bureaucratic control and 
internal labor markets. American Journal of  Sociology 
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